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The impact of contracts on trust in entrepreneur-VC relationships. 
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ABSTRACT  
Venture capitalists (VCs) increasingly rely on elaborate formal contracts and incentivization 
through share ownership to manage their relationships with the entrepreneurial firms they 
invest in. This study analyzes the impact of a high degree of such “neoclassical contracting” 
on entrepreneurs’ trust in their VC backers. The results from a sample of 86 Dutch 
entrepreneurial firms indicate not only that a high degree of neoclassical contracting tends to 
erode entrepreneurs’ trust in their VCs, but also that the use of more informal, relational 
contracting fails to moderate the negative association between a strong focus on neoclassical 
contracts and trust. However, entrepreneurs do welcome some level of monitoring, which 
highlights the enduring tension between trust and control, and the need for VCs to strike a 
productive balance.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
According to a Gallup survey of European small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
conducted in July 2009, access to finance remains a key challenge facing entrepreneurial 
firms. While only a few such firms have access to Venture Capitalist (hereafter VC) funding, 
these firms often achieve high levels of innovation and growth (European Commission 2009).  
In VC-entrepreneurial relationships both parties need each other: the entrepreneur has 
a novel competitive opportunity and perhaps the technical understanding to realize its 
potential (Cable and Shane, 1997), while the VC brings risk capital, expertise in formulating 
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effective commercial strategies and access to valuable networks of customers, suppliers and 
other capital providers (Busenitz et al., 2004; Gorman and Shaman, 1989; MacMillan et al., 
1989). A workable level of mutual cooperation between them is a necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition for the success of VC-backed firms (Cable and Shane, 1997). 
Yet, as a forward exchange (i.e. a transaction in which returns are only generated and 
allocated sometime in the future: Hung, 2006), both parties face the prospect of being 
exploited by the other, as well as the possibility of a failed venture (Cable and Shane, 1997; 
De Clercq and Sapienza, 2001; Gorman and Shaman, 1989). Both are exposed to the threat of 
divergent objectives regarding decisions such as the valuation of stock, strategic goals, 
allocation of resources, risk management and exit timing (Busenitz et al., 1997; Wijbenga et 
al., 2007). In addition, neither party can enjoy complete knowledge about their partner’s 
future intentions, and may doubt the other’s general and specific competences. Both must 
nevertheless rely upon the specialist knowledge and resources brought to the table by the 
other. Just as VCs need to have confidence in the entrepreneur (De Clercq and Sapienza, 
2006: 341; Hung, 2006; Harrison et al., 1997), so too must entrepreneurs have confidence in 
their VCs to realize the successful outcomes sought from the investment. Confident risk-
taking for a mutually productive collaboration is the essence of positive VC-entrepreneur 
relationships (Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). 
Confident risk-taking in turn requires trust. In definitional terms, trust is founded upon 
an evaluation of the focal party’s ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995) 
forming an overall assessment of their trustworthiness. Positive expectations across these 
dimensions inform a willingness to accept vulnerability in dealings with that party (Rousseau 
et al., 1998). This is demonstrated in risk-taking acts, such as increasing dependence on the 
trustee, sharing resources, and reduced monitoring of their actions (Dietz and den Hartog, 
2006; McEvily et al., 2003).  
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Trust has been shown to play a crucial role in managing ambiguous relationships 
characterized by risk (Das and Teng, 1998), such as that between an entrepreneur and her VC 
backers. Research confirms that confident risk-taking by both entrepreneur and VC is 
essential for a mutually productive collaboration in venture capitalist backed enterprises 
(Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). Trust can impact positively on the attitudes and behaviors of 
participants to a project by encouraging and fostering collaboration, information sharing and 
creativity (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2005, 2006; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001). Yet trust has so far 
received limited attention within the entrepreneurship literature (for reviews see Welter and 
Smallbone, 2006; Hohmann and Welter, 2005).  
The governance structures of entrepreneurial firms may be a decisive factor in 
securing this trust. Increasingly, VCs are placing importance on the use of strict, elaborate 
contracts for the control and monitoring of entrepreneurial firms (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2002; Zahra et al., 2006). Such neoclassical contracts specify, ex-ante, detailed 
incentive, control and arbitration mechanisms. Many VCs perceive this type of contract as an 
effective substitute for more flexible, “relational” means of control, which emphasize more 
developmental means of coordinating relationships based on interpersonal communication 
and informal goodwill (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Nooteboom et al., 1997).  
While entrepreneurs might expect a certain degree of neoclassical contracting as a 
matter of course in any dealings with VC backers, such stringent contractual controls were 
primarily developed in the context of large listed companies with highly diversified minority 
investors. Elaborate neoclassical contracts may not transfer well to more cooperative 
relationships such as those between entrepreneurs and VCs. They might even have 
unintended consequences for the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC.  
To date, the majority of the research on trust in entrepreneurial settings has focused 
on the perspective of the VC; the entrepreneurs’ perspective has been neglected. An 
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exception is the study by Busenitz et al. (1997). They analyzed a variety of conditions 
affecting new venture teams’ (NVTs) perceptions of fairness in the relationship with their 
VC. They found that earn out arrangements, the team’s industry experience and average 
tenure in the firm negatively framed NVTs’ fairness perceptions, while the length of time the 
team had been working together was positively related. Interestingly, for the purposes of this 
study, the use of constraining covenants was found to be unrelated. 
This study also takes the entrepreneurs’ perspective. We test the impact of the degree 
to which two different types of control are employed on entrepreneurs’ trust in their VC 
backers, with a sample collected in the Netherlands. We first locate our theorizing within 
agency theory, exploring how readily corporate governance mechanisms developed based on 
agency theoretical assumptions can be transferred to VC-entrepreneur relations. We then 
review the available studies on the impact of contracts and more relational forms of control 
on our dependent variable, the entrepreneur’s perception of the trustworthiness of their VC. 
Next, we provide information about the study’s method, and report the results. We conclude 
with a discussion of the implications of our findings. 
 
THEORY  
Agency theory and corporate governance: neoclassical contracts. 
Agency theorists assert that, due to the separation of ownership and control, principals 
need to reduce the agents’ interest in exploitative opportunistic behaviors. The principal (i.e. 
the VC investor) needs to reduce the information asymmetry presumed to be enjoyed by the 
agent (i.e. the entrepreneur) (Williamson, 1988), and align the agent’s interests to his own 
(Ang et al., 2000) to avoid opportunism, such as the use of corporate resources for private 
purposes, the divestiture of valuable company assets to firms owned by the agent at below 
market prices (i.e. “tunneling”), excessive risk taking or shirking (Arthurs and Busenitz, 
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2003; Ang et al., 2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). This is 
best achieved through binding neoclassical contracting and/or incentive mechanisms (see 
Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). 
Neoclassical contracts establish and frame the relationship by delegating decision-
making authority over some of the principal’s assets to the agent; defining the boundaries of 
discretionary behavior for both principal and agent, and setting out the basic institutional 
structure for ongoing negotiations, incentives and sanctions regarding the pursuit of both 
parties’ objectives (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Levinthal 1988). 
Principal-agent theory proposes that such contracts reduce the principal’s risk, thereby 
making investment relationships more efficient. 
The possibility that emergent interpersonal experience (i.e. “relational” contracting) 
might help principals and agents to develop a better appreciation of each other’s intrinsic 
motivations, attitudes and behavior patterns, and therefore to trust each other as people rather 
than as signatories to a legal contract – and that this form of governance might serve as 
effectively as highly detailed and formalized contracts, if not more so (Barney and Hansen, 
1994) – is not even considered by agency theorists.  
 There are several reasons why a high degree of neoclassical contracting might 
negatively affect entrepreneurs’ trust in VCs. Firstly, the entrepreneur is typically the much 
weaker party in such relationships. Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) analysis assumes that both 
entrepreneurs and investors will be able to anticipate and value potential agency costs ex-ante 
reliably, and that entrepreneurs are able to choose principals who fit their preferences. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) also expect entrepreneurs to be able to simply exit an unfavorable 
investment relationship at any time, and find a more favorable investor instead. In economies 
with liquid capital markets for SMEs, both the entrepreneur and the investor are provided 
with a choice of partners, which improves the balance of power not only during the initial 
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bargaining stage but in negotiations subsequent to the investment. Research by Graebner 
(2009) confirms that VCs operating in liquid capital markets (e.g. the USA) are acutely aware 
that their behavior towards entrepreneurial firms shapes their reputation, and thereby their 
ability to engage in future acquisitions successfully. However, in most economies, capital 
markets for small businesses tend to be characterized by poor efficiency and liquidity 
(Lawton, 2002; Boocock and Woods, 1997). The distinct lack of a primary, let alone a 
replacement, market for each party involved (Cable and Shane, 1997) means that “hold-up 
problems” may occur, effectively allowing one party to hold the other hostage. In practice, 
the advantage here is firmly with the VC (Landström et al., 1998).  
Secondly, many of the typical rights and obligations enshrined in neoclassical 
contracts are one-sided in favor of the investor, including board member voting rules; veto 
rights over important decisions; investors’ rights of inspection of accounting and legal books; 
anti-dilution terms; limits to managerial salaries; conditions for replacing incumbent 
managers; even the right to dismiss the entrepreneur (Busenitz et al., 1997; Mason and Stark, 
2004). Once these constraining conditions are approved by the parties, entrepreneurs have 
little chance to reconsider or modify them, and hence may develop negative perceptions of 
fairness and goodwill in the relationship (Busenitz et al., 1997). All of these conditions may 
work to constrain opportunism and lessen the principal’s risk, but they do little to invite, or 
nurture, the entrepreneur’s trust. 
Thirdly, and related, experienced VCs generally have much greater expertise or 
access to powerful legal counsel when negotiating a contract (see Landström et al., 1998; 
Busenitz et al., 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004). While in theory entrepreneurs can safeguard 
themselves by hiring good legal representatives, research indicates a tendency for 
entrepreneurial firm representatives to focus on informal, trust-based agreements rather than 
formal contracts (Graebner, 2009). The power asymmetry created by elaborate contracts is 
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likely to increase the principal’s temptation to exploit the weaker partner (Komorita and 
Parks, 1995). If the entrepreneur is aware of this temptation, it may further erode their trust in 
their VC.  
Strict contractual arrangements aimed at preventing opportunistic behavior may 
discourage co-operative behavior (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). 
Agents may become less inclined to be personally involved with the principal and to fully 
disclose the venture’s details, anticipating punishment from the principal should things go 
wrong. Entrepreneurs’ reluctance to seek help and advice from VCs for fear of making 
themselves vulnerable to sanctions is likely to impact on the economic success of the venture. 
Additionally, contracts that cover many contingencies with respect to well-specified 
rights and duties and strictly quantifiable performance targets can be overly complex, 
denying flexibility to the parties (Busenitz et al., 1997; Landström et al., 1998; Jap, 2001). 
Emphasis on the decision control function can lead to rigidity in the entrepreneurial firm’s 
decision making process, impeding the agent’s capacity to make quick changes to the firm’s 
strategy and operations, or exploit innovations. This is likely to cause further frustration for 
the agent with the principal (Busenitz et al., 1997).  
The concomitant neglect by agency theory of the possibility of positive interpersonal 
reciprocity is especially problematic for entrepreneurial firms, as the success of such firms 
relies upon active cooperation between entrepreneurs and VCs (Cable and Shane, 1997). 
Also, firm founders tend to display very high degrees of intrinsic motivation, which might be 
eroded if outside investors increase their influence over the company’s management and limit 
the founder’s discretion (Boocock and Woods, 1997; Wasserman, 2006; Arthurs and 
Busenitz, 2003). 
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Agency theory and corporate governance: incentivization through share ownership. 
Agency theory’s other recommendation is to incentivize the agent to act appropriately 
on the principal’s behalf through managerial share ownership, as both parties’ wealth and 
income will increase if the firm prospers (Holderness, 2003; Gompers and Lerner, 2000: 131; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 1983b). Applied to VC-entrepreneur relations, investors seek to 
align the interests of the entrepreneurs with their own by requiring entrepreneurs to maintain 
significant investments in the venture. This shared destiny is expected to increase mutual trust 
in the relationship. 
However, contractual features such as ownership stake requirements, executive 
payment in share options and high leverage ratios increase the risk and costs of bankruptcy 
for the entrepreneur (Barnes et al., 1996; Ang et al., 2000). VCs can benefit from sharing the 
risk with other investors, and from general risk reduction through investment diversification, 
but entrepreneurs usually risk all or most of their assets in one venture (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b). Moreover, while VCs can usually spread their investment uncertainty across multiple 
rounds of investment (Wasserman, 2006), entrepreneurs often have to commit to their 
investment from the outset. This strengthens further the VC’s powerful position since their 
sunk costs are comparatively lower than those of the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs might 
therefore interpret elaborate neoclassical contracts that require them to maintain a high stake 
in the company, and accept shares or share options as a significant part of their remuneration, 
as an indication of the VC’s mistrust.  
Finally, Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) suggest that, taking into consideration the non-
financial investments of time, energy and sweat equity made by the entrepreneur, it is likely 
that entrepreneurs see their “ownership” as something greater than merely financial 
ownership. Share-based incentivization may be counterproductive, as it deflates the agent’s 
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intrinsic motivation (and psychological ownership) and limits their scope to maneuver 
(Wassermann, 2006).  
 
Relational contracting.  
While neoclassical contract theory assumes that contractual relationships can be modeled as 
discrete transactions, without taking into account social and personal contexts, and can best 
be governed by elaborate and specific contracts, relational contract theory highlights the 
importance of more informal arrangements (Macneil, 1981). These are far less specific and 
allow far more room for the development of collaborative relationships based on ongoing 
communication and negotiation. Relational contracting tends to focus on aspects of the 
ongoing relationship itself, and these may depend on the extent to which shared values and 
parties’ expectations about future interactions have been established, independent of any 
binding contract between the parties (Macneil, 1981; Heide, 1994). Relational “controls” 
extend significant autonomy to the agent by minimizing a priori constraints, thereby 
enhancing the agent’s intrinsic motivation to perform effectively in pursuit of the success of 
the entrepreneurial firm (Wassermann, 2006). Additionally, if contracts are softened, it 
should become easier for entrepreneurs to respond, with the VC’s consent, to changes in the 
business environment (see Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
However, as relational contracts are less specific and often based on informal 
agreements, they are more difficult to enforce and provide contractual partners with less 
protection from exploitation by opportunistic behavior. Graebner’s (2009) research on the 
acquisition of entrepreneurial firms suggests that the inability to enforce relational contracts 
might lead investors to disregard them as non-binding, and just mere words extended as part 
of social interactions with entrepreneurs. Yet many entrepreneurs place great emphasis on the 
(non-contractual) ‘word’ – informal commitments, verbal promises – of their investors.  
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In practice, of course, contractual relationships tend to be neither wholly neoclassical 
nor relational but located along a continuum between the two extreme positions of formal, 
fairly anonymous, comprehensive and specific neoclassical contracts and informal, trust-
based, continuously developing relational contracts. Increasingly, however, venture 
capitalists tend to favor the former type of arrangements. 
The potential for the increased focus on neoclassical contracts, as advocated by 
agency theory, to damage entrepreneurs’ confidence in VCs, and the relative merits of 
relational contracting as an alternative, also seem to be supported by research into the effects 
of different forms of control on trust.  
 
Trust and different forms of contract. 
The debate on the effects of different forms of control on trust posits two main perspectives: 
substitution and complementarity (see Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007). 
The substitution thesis holds that trust and control are alternative approaches for 
managing a relationship (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). The more trust there is in a 
relationship, the fewer formal controls are necessary; conversely, the less trust there is, the 
more controls are needed to compensate (Gulati, 1995). In this condition the presence of any 
contract is based on assumptions of suspicion and the sanctions enshrined in the contract are 
presumed to obviate the need for “trust” – similar to agency theory assumptions. 
Alternatively, contracts ensure a form of “trust” based on deterrence, although this ought not 
to be considered “real” trust in the sense of positive expectations (Rousseau et al., 1998: 399). 
Thus, while VCs may use neoclassical contracts to safeguard their interests, entrepreneurs 
might view them as a signal of the VCs’ lack of confidence in them, and this may stifle 
attempts at fruitful collaboration.  
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However compelling this substitution effect may seem in theory, there is no consistent 
empirical evidence for it (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005: 
817). The complementarity thesis tends to be more favored theoretically and found to be 
more prevalent empirically. This depicts trust and control as separate but co-existing, and 
even mutually reinforcing, means for arriving at a stable order of relations. In this 
perspective, one party may feel able to trust the other because of the existence of a formal 
contract, while two parties who trust each other may wish to confirm and cement their 
relational trust through joint commitment to a contract, much like formal marriage vows 
(Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). This thesis suggests that agency theoretical recommendations 
regarding neoclassical contracts might have a positive impact on entrepreneurs’ trust in VCs.  
Yet the imposition of controls is widely assumed to be antagonistic to strong trust 
(Nooteboom et al., 1997: 318), and can have a “pernicious effect” on cooperation (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002: 711). Malhotra and Murnighan (2002: 547) found that contracts may elicit 
modest levels of cooperation, but their introduction also “impeded the development of trust” 
and “diminished existing trust”. This is likely to be especially true for parties seeking to 
retain independence and control of their own fate, such as entrepreneurs.  
Das and Teng (1998, 2001) argue that “social” and normative controls (in our 
terminology, “relational contracting”) are more likely to improve understanding and 
accommodate flexibility, and hence enhance trust. The entrepreneur may interpret this 
autonomy as indicative of the VC’s benevolence. By contrast, formal controls (e.g. a 
“neoclassical contract”) may deny parties autonomy to act and undermine impressions of the 
other’s self-governed goodwill, as well as generating tensions that compromise the partners’ 
competence.  
Thus, considering the available studies on trust and control, the increased use of 
neoclassical contracting looks likely to have a negative effect on fostering entrepreneurs’ 
  12 
trust in their VC, while “relational” contracting may prove more effective. (Of course, 
without a minimum level of trust, no contract can work: see Das and Teng, 2001: 265.) 
 
HYPOTHESES  
Based on our review of the literature we developed the following model (Figure 1), and 
associated hypotheses. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
In situations characterized by efficient markets, neoclassical contracting is expected to benefit 
both the principal and the agent and lead to the efficient allocation of rights and obligations 
between both (Levinthal 1988). In this case, neoclassical contracting might be seen by the VC 
as a substitute for the need to develop trust: the substitution thesis. This points to a negative 
relationship between trust and neoclassical contracting. Alternatively, the complementarity 
thesis suggests that neoclassical contracting might provide both principals and agents with a 
basis for the development of trust, thereby suggesting a positive association between trust and 
neoclassical contracting. As we argued above, VC-entrepreneur relationships in most 
countries are not conducted in the context of efficient markets. Therefore, neoclassical 
contracting tends to cement the asymmetric distribution of power between the VC and the 
entrepreneur which exists due to the lack of transparency and liquidity of the relevant capital 
markets (Cable and Shane, 1997) and the greater legal expertise of VCs in drawing up 
contracts. In sum, we do not expect neoclassical contracts to have a benign effect on trust. 
This leads us to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative association between the use of elaborate 
neoclassical contracts and the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC.  
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Agency theory suggests that managerial part-ownership of the venture should lead to a 
reduction of friction between entrepreneurs and their outside investors and ought therefore to 
be positively associated with trust. However, as previously discussed, entrepreneurs who own 
high ownership stakes in their business might perceive a high degree of neoclassical 
contracting as an unwelcome threat. This is due to the increased risks such a contractual 
arrangement can entail for them and their relative vulnerability vis-à-vis their VC backer (i.e. 
entrepreneurs typically having to invest up-front and to risk all or most of their assets in the 
one venture, coupled with VCs’ capacity to invest across multiple investment rounds and 
diversify their investment risks across multiple ventures). Additionally, the imposition of 
greater share ownership requirements alongside a neo-classical contract may seem, in the 
entrepreneurs’ eyes, to down-grade or belittle their intrinsic, non-financial, motivations. We 
thus predict that incentivization through share ownership will not ameliorate relations 
governed by neoclassical contracts, but will exacerbate the potential for mistrust manifest in 
the neo-classical contract. In sum, greater share ownership is expected to impact negatively 
on entrepreneurs’ perception of VCs’ trustworthiness when relations are governed by 
neoclassical contracts: 
Hypothesis 2: The agent’s share of ownership moderates the negative association 
between the use of elaborate neoclassical contracts and the trust of the entrepreneur 
in the VC such that this negative association will be stronger when the entrepreneur 
has a greater share ownership in the venture. 
In contrast to neoclassical contracts, relational contracting is based on more informal 
arrangements in which agents have significant autonomy and ongoing communication and 
negotiations play key roles for the development of collaborative partnerships. We have seen 
how relational contracting relies on a high degree of communication and negotiation, and this 
allows the contracting partners to get to know each other, helping them to develop, first-hand, 
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clear expectations about each other’s trustworthiness: a form of “goodwill trust” (cf. Das and 
Teng, 2001). This suggests that the use of more informal, “relational” arrangements should 
prove more conducive to the entrepreneur’s perceptions of the trustworthiness of the VC. 
Thus:  
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive association between the use of relational contracts 
and the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC.  
The complementarity thesis suggests that trust and control are mutually reinforcing because 
the contracting parties may feel able to trust the other due to the existence of enforceable 
neoclassical contracts limiting the risk of exploitation. Yet the concerns of entrepreneurs 
about the trustworthiness of VCs who safeguard their own rights by employing a high degree 
of neoclassical contracting might be reduced if these strict contracts are complemented by a 
high degree of relational contracting. Indeed, the complementarity thesis implies that two 
parties who trust each other may wish to affirm their relational trust by signing up to a 
binding neoclassical contract. We might therefore expect any negative influence from a high 
degree of neoclassical contracting on perceptions of VCs’ trustworthiness to be moderated 
(i.e. weakened) by a concurrent high degree of relational contracting.  
Conversely, it could be argued that entrepreneurs whose relationship with their VC is 
characterized by strong relational contracting might perceive the parallel existence of an 
elaborate neoclassical contract as an indication of their VC’s lack of trustworthiness (i.e. a 
contradictory signal of intentions), or as a potential threat because the VC could use the 
legally enforceable neoclassical contract to challenge any informal relational commitments. 
In this case, neoclassical contracting would be expected to moderate (i.e. weaken) the 
positive association between the use of relational contracts and the entrepreneur’s trust in the 
VC.  
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Since neoclassical contracts tend to be designed ex-ante, while relational contracting 
develops ex-post, we expect the former relationship to be more likely than the latter. Thus:  
Hypothesis 4: The use of relational contracting moderates the negative association 
between the use of elaborate neoclassical contracts and the entrepreneur’s trust in the 




A questionnaire was sent to the whole population of venture capital-backed companies in the 
Netherlands in 2003, sourced from the dataset of the Dutch Chambers of Commerce, as well 
as from annual reports and Internet sites of VCs operating in the Netherlands. Of the 611 
companies that received VC funding that year, 86 useable questionnaires were returned after 
two mailing rounds. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests indicate that there are no significant 
differences between early and late respondents for any of the variables. This response rate of 
14% is comparable to the typical rate of 10-12% for studies targeting Chief Executives 
(Schulze et al., 2001), and small businesses (De Kok and Uhlaner, 2001). Cochran’s (1977) 
formula for sample size requirement shows that a sample of more than 61 firms is sufficient 
to make generalizations about a relatively small population of 611 firms, with a 4% margin of 
error for 7-point Likert scales.  
 
Dependent variable 
The proxy for the dependent variable, trust, is based on Kumar et al.’s (1995) measure. 
Strictly speaking, this is a measure of perceived trustworthiness (see Dietz and den Hartog, 
2006), expectations of which form the basis of the actual decision to trust. However, the 
  16 
entrepreneurs surveyed are clearly exhibiting risk taking behavior associated with their 
perceptions of their VC’s trustworthiness.  
Kumar’s scale encompasses two sub-dimensions. The first is trust in the partner’s 
integrity: the belief that the partner will stand by their word, fulfill promised obligations, and 
be sincere. The second is trust in the partner’s benevolence: the belief that the partner is 
committed to the firm’s welfare and will not take deliberate actions that might damage the 
firm’s prospects. Trust exists, therefore, when the agent (entrepreneur) expects the principal 
(VC backer) to display these two characteristics. (The VC’s “ability” is captured in the “VC – 
added value” scales.) The items were ranged on a Likert scale where 1 = “Totally disagree” 
and 7 = “Totally agree”.  
Factor analysis showed that perceptions of “integrity” and “benevolence” could not be 
separated. All items showed high factor loadings on a single factor, except the items “The VC 
has often provided us information that has later proven to be inaccurate” (reverse coded) and 
“When we share our problems with the VC, we know that he/she will respond with 
understanding”. We removed these items. The resulting factor analysis shows a 
unidimensional measure of trust, explaining 60.87% of the variance with factor loadings 
ranging from 0.47 to 0.86 (see Table 1a). The Cronbach α for the trust scale is 0.90.  
[INSERT TABLE 1A ABOUT HERE] 
Explanatory variables 
In line with Macneil’s (1981, 2000) argument that contracts are located along a spectrum 
from neoclassical contracts to relational contracts, VCs tend to use both types of contracting 
to varying degrees to manage relationships with entrepreneurs. To capture this in our design, 
we adapted Lusch and Brown’s (1996) behavioral-based contracting measures to the VC-
entrepreneurial firm setting. Lusch and Brown derived their measures’ construct validity from 
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Heide (1994), who identified six key elements used to maintain interorganizational relations: 
role specification, planning, adjustment processes, monitoring procedures, means of 
enforcement and incentive systems. Lusch and Brown’s (1996) measures match with the key 
elements of role specification, planning, adjustment processes and means of enforcement. 
The two missing elements are covered by our survey instrument as follows: “Monitoring 
procedures” relates to the use of systems that measure output and behavior, which is reflected 
in our “VC value-added - monitoring” measure. “Incentive systems” refer to the types of 
incentives used and the basis on which they are distributed. The share of ownership possessed 
by the entrepreneur can be regarded as a proxy for an incentive system. The items for both 
types of contracts were ranged on a 1-7 Likert scale (1 = “Totally disagree” and 7 = “Totally 
agree”). Factor analysis aimed at determining the scales’ unidimensionality and discriminant 
validity further helped to refine the scales (see Table 1b).1  
The neoclassical contracting measure refers to the degree to which each party’s roles, 
responsibilities, performance obligations and the handling of unexpected events are precisely 
defined in a written contract. The measure therefore focuses on specific behaviors, rather than 
on counting the number of sentences, pages or clauses in the contract. Cronbach α is 0.88. 
The relational contracting measure refers to the degree to which there is mutual 
understanding regarding each party’s roles and responsibilities, and how each party is to 
perform. Cronbach α is 0.92.  
[INSERT TABLE 1B ABOUT HERE] 
Control variables 
 Since trust is based not only on the perception of a partner’s benevolence and integrity 
but also competence (Mayer et al., 1995) and since VCs do not only contribute to the venture 
by providing risk capital but also engage in additional “value adding activities” (Wijbenga et 
al., 2007), it is essential to control for whether such additional services provided by the VC 
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affect the entrepreneurs’ perception of their trustworthiness. In the venture capital literature 
the value-adding activities of VCs tend to be differentiated into “added value through 
networking” and “added value through monitoring”.  
In the first case, VCs support the venture by introducing the entrepreneurs to social 
and professional networks to improve their access to potential clients, distributers, investors, 
advisors, regulatory agencies, as well as tangible resources (Hillman and Daziel, 2003; 
MacMillan et al., 1989; Sapienza and Timmons, 1989). The degree to which such access to 
networks is facilitated by VCs not only demonstrates their competence as venture capitalists 
but also their level of cooperation with the entrepreneur. 
VCs may additionally seek to improve the performance of the entrepreneurial firm 
through close supervision of the business, drawing upon their presumed expertise in key 
strategic domains (Wijbenga et al., 2007). On the one hand, such monitoring may be 
interpreted by the entrepreneur as indicative of concern for the venture’s success (i.e. 
benevolence), and a sign of competence by helping the entrepreneur to be more effective 
(Flynn, 2001; Bijlsma-Frankema and Van de Bunt, 2003). Frequent communication and 
timely information sharing may also help to resolve disputes and align perceptions and 
expectations (see Busenitz et al., 1997). On the other hand, such efforts may be perceived as 
indicative of the VC’s lack of trust in, and even respect for, the entrepreneur. This may prove 
corrosive of the reciprocated trust shown by the entrepreneur in the VC. 
 In the “VC value-added – networking” and “VC value-added – monitoring” scales, 
the entrepreneurs were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that 
their VC had displayed these behaviors on a Likert scale from 1-7 (“Totally disagree” to 
“Totally agree”). Both types of value-adding activities can be distinguished and separated in 
the factor analysis (see Table 1c). The factor loadings for the items of both scales are higher 
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than 0.7. The Cronbach α for “VC value-added – networking” is 0.81; the Cronbach α for 
“VC value-added – monitoring” is 0.85. 
[INSERT TABLE 1C ABOUT HERE] 
We included formal relationship tenure as a covariate in the analysis. The duration of the 
relationship might impact on the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC, because of the presumption 
of an accumulation of positive or negative evidence over time of the VC’s conduct and 
attitudes (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994), and the effects of regular direct communication over 
time. The measure was taken from the date the company-level contract between the principal 
and agent was signed.  
While the sample size limits our ability to include a large range of industry controls in 
our model, we employ the dummy variable “ICT/Life sciences” as a covariate, to indicate 
whether the entrepreneurial firm competes in an emergent industry or not. Emergent 
industries are generally characterized by high levels of uncertainty, which may make each 
party more vulnerable to opportunistic behavior from the other (Das and Teng, 2001). 
However, the dummy not only controls for an increased perception of entrepreneurs in 
emergent industries to be at risk of exploitation, but also for potential industry typical norms 
regarding the degree and content of “normal” neoclassical contracting in the high-tech 
industry. Lockett et al. (2002) highlight that the newness and complexity of the products, 
markets and technology in the high-tech industry pose particular challenges to VC firms, 
which have responded to these problems by developing specific due diligence, screening and 
monitoring practices.  
As smaller firms may be expected to enjoy less power in the relationship with their 
VC, we included a proxy for firm size, which is the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees. We did this logarithmic transformation in order to account for the wide disparity 
in the number of employees among the set of firms. 
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 Poor performance of the venture might induce VCs to increase the use of neoclassical 
contracting in order to increase their level of control over the entrepreneur and strengthen 
performance incentives. Alternatively, VCs might already have neoclassical contracts in 
place which allow them to increase their influence over the venture and potentially reduce the 
ownership rights of the entrepreneur when firms perform poorly (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2002). In either case, the increased control rights of the VC might create more 
tensions in the relationship, and erode the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC. We therefore test 
whether the relationships between contracting types and the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC are 
driven by firm performance with two measures, sales and employee growth. 
Common method variance 
Since the study is based upon a single-respondent survey, we followed Podsakoff et al.’s 
(2003) recommended strategies for reducing common method bias. We ensured that we used 
scales with overtly different items, guaranteed respondents’ anonymity, and the questions for 
the dependent variable (i.e. trust) preceded the questions for the independent variables (i.e. 
the contracting scales) in the questionnaire. We also conducted a Harman’s single-factor test 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). A factor analysis conducted with the items in the trust measure, the 
neoclassical and relational contracting measures, and a factor analysis with the items of the 
trust measure, VC monitoring and networking measures provide evidence that the analysis of 
the hypotheses does not appear to suffer from common method bias. The items of the 
contracting measures did not load highly on the factor which identified our trust measure.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables. As expected, 
there is a significant and positive association between the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC and 
relational contracting (r = .56, p < .01). There is no significant association between 
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neoclassical contracting and the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC. We also find a significant and 
positive association between the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC and with the VC’s added 
value in monitoring (r =.48, p < .01) and networking (r = .35, p < .01). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The significant and negative association between ICT/life sciences and the entrepreneur’s 
trust in the VC (r = -.29, p < .05) suggests that entrepreneurs in these more volatile industries 
(compared to manufacturing and services) may feel more vulnerable to exploitation, and 
therefore perceive a higher risk that their VC will behave opportunistically. There is no 
significant correlation between ICT/life sciences and either neoclassical or relational 
contracting, which suggests that the degree of neoclassical and relational contracting in the 
high-tech industry does not differ from that in other industries. 
Table 3 presents the OLS-regression analysis (Model 1) of hypotheses 1 and 3. Table 
4 presents the moderated OLS-regression analysis of hypothesis 2 (Model 2) and hypothesis 
4 (Model 3). For the analysis, the interaction term variables were zero-centered before their 
crossproduct terms were calculated to produce a meaningful interpretation of the main effects 
of the interaction terms, and to reduce multicollinearity (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003: 24). To 
further avoid problems with multicollinearity we tested the interaction terms for hypothesis 2 
and 4 in two separate models. Diagnostics indicate no multicollinearity problems for these 
three models, as tolerance levels are well above .55 (and hence VIF values well below 1.82) 
and condition indexes are below 11.19.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Hypothesis 1 is supported. Model 1 (Table 3) shows that there is a negative association 
between the use of neoclassical contracts and the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC (β = -.22; 
p<.05). This suggests that entrepreneurs who are controlled by their VCs using detailed, 
highly specific, comprehensive written contracts, perceive their VC backers as less 
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trustworthy than entrepreneurs whose relationship with their VCs is based on a lesser degree 
of neoclassical contracting. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Hypothesis 2 is supported. Model 2 (Table 4) shows that a higher degree of share 
ownership on the part of the entrepreneurs worsens relationships governed by neoclassical 
contracts (β = -.18; p<.05). This suggests that entrepreneurs with a large stake in the firm feel 
more vulnerable against the wide range of contractual rights which reside with VCs. The 
difference value of the ΔR2 of the “main effects only” model and the model with the 
interaction term is 0.03 (Δ F: 4.40; p < 0.05), which is a typical value for field study 
interactions in the social science literature (Champoux and Peters 1987; Chaplin 1991; 
McClelland and Judd 1993). However, such a comparison index may be positively biased by 
our relatively small sample size (see Jaccard and Turrise, 2003: 29). The standardized effect 
size statistic with a value of 0.08 suggests that the effect size of the interaction is relatively 
weak (> 0.02 is weak, while > 0.15 is a medium effect, and > 0.35 is a strong effect). The 
interaction effect is graphically illustrated in Figure 2. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Hypothesis 3 is supported. As reported in Model 1 (Table 3), there is a positive 
association between the use of relational contracts and the entrepreneur’s impressions of the 
VC as trustworthy (β = .46; p<.01).  
However, hypothesis 4 is not supported (Table 4, Model 3). Relational contracting 
does not seem to ameliorate relationships governed by elaborate neoclassical contracts, and 
neoclassical contracting similarly does not seem to enhance or damage relational contracting.  
Table 3 (Model 1) shows that the relationship between VC added value in networking 
and the entrepreneur’s trust in the VC is not significant, suggesting that this effort by VCs 
may go unnoticed and unappreciated, at least in terms of trust development. However, there 
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is a positive relationship between VC added value from monitoring and the entrepreneur’s 
trust in the VC (Table 3, Model 1: β = .25; p<.05). This suggests that the information 
revealed by monitoring may lead to the VC’s better understanding of the entrepreneur’s 
situation, enabling the VC to give more effective support, and this may lead the entrepreneur 
to perceive the VC as more trustworthy (i.e. competent and benevolent).  
 Finally, we tested whether the relationships between contracting types and 
entrepreneurs’ trust in VCs are driven by firms’ performance, using sales and employee 
growth over the past three years for the 65 companies for which we had performance data. 
The correlations between sales growth and the trust measure (r = -.01; p < .96), neoclassical 
contract (r = .02; p < .90) and relational contracting (r = .09; p < .48) were all insignificant, as 
were those between employees’ growth and trust (r = -.18; p < .15), neoclassical contracts (r 
= .07; p < .59) and relational contracting (r = -.01; p < .97). These results suggest that there is 
no correlation between firm performance and the degree of neoclassical or relational 
contracting. Moreover, there is no correlation between firm performance and entrepreneurial 
trust in the VC. There were no changes to our results when we added the performance 
measures as covariates to the regression equations. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Previous research suggests that trust can impact positively on the attitudes and behaviors of 
participants to a project, and is a vital element of VC-entrepreneur relations (Sapienza and 
Korsgaard, 1996). The perception of VCs’ trustworthiness, both in terms of their competence 
and integrity, is likely to affect entrepreneurs’ decisions to seek VC investors to facilitate 
innovation in and growth of companies and the degree to which entrepreneurs in VC backed 
firms draw on VCs’ expertise and advice. This paper has examined, from the perspective of 
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the entrepreneur, the tension between trust and control in the management of VC-
entrepreneur relationships. Our findings point to several concerns.  
The increasing focus of VCs on the use of neoclassical contracting might have 
unintended negative consequences. We found such contracts to be negatively related with the 
entrepreneur’s perception of their VC’s trustworthiness. This impression appears to get 
worse, rather than better, when a high degree of neoclassical contracting is combined with a 
high share of ownership by the entrepreneur in the firm. By contrast, our theorizing and our 
empirical findings suggest that relational contracting is more effective in facilitating positive 
entrepreneur perceptions of their VC’s trustworthiness. These findings affirm what is 
becoming an established pattern of results in the trust literature on the effects of different 
forms of control. Yet the failure of relational contracting to reduce the negative impact of 
strict neoclassical contracting on entrepreneurs’ trust in VCs, and the finding that positive 
perceptions of VC trustworthiness developed in a context of relational contracting are not 
damaged by neoclassical contracting, point to complex interaction effects worthy of future 
research. 
 Principal-agent theory argues that a degree of control is clearly essential, in order to 
avoid exploitation in relationships characterized by asymmetric information and potentially 
divergent interests. We do not disagree. Indeed, our findings on the positive relationship 
between “VC value-added via monitoring” and the entrepreneurs’ trust in VCs do suggest 
that a certain degree of monitoring activity is perceived to be benign, and indicative of the 
VC’s expertise and trustworthiness – a possibility previously raised by Bijlsma-Frankema 
and van de Bunt (2003). This particular finding is especially interesting from a trust 
development perspective, since much of that literature assumes that in trusting relationships 
the need for monitoring the other party should reduce.  
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 Our findings suggest, therefore, that controls are not the issue; the problems lie with 
the forms, and intensity, of the controls. While we investigated the degree of neoclassical 
contracting and relational contracting, further research might investigate the impact of 
differences in the content of such contracts. Das and Teng (1998, 2001) suggest that the 
potential degree of complementarity depends on the type of control used (behavioral, output, 
social). Poppo and Zenger (2002: 731) propose that the precise terms included in a detailed 
contract may influence cooperation levels between parties, and contracts that provide 
“frameworks for bilateral adjustments may facilitate the evolution of highly cooperative 
exchange relations” (emphasis added). This should be explored in future research. 
What is expected by entrepreneurs as a “normal” level of neoclassical contracting is 
likely to depend at least to a certain degree on the industry their firm operates within, as well 
as the firm’s size, the investment volume and the type of venture capitalist. It would also be 
interesting to see whether these findings are replicated in different national cultural and 
institutional settings. Dutch culture is individualistic but with a strong normative value of 
consensus-building (Hofstede, 1980), and legal contracts are understood to be enforceable in 
the Netherlands.2 The differential effects of these variables could be explored in future 
research.  
 With regard to the development of governance systems, this research underlines the 
importance of paying close attention not only to the specific incentive structures of principals 
and agents but also to the power structures and social norms in their relationship (Macneil, 
1981). It is crucial to take account of the potential for exploitation of either side. In VC-
backed firms, a tight focus on control-oriented corporate governance mechanisms could 
crowd out other important functions of the board, such as the provision of specialist advice, 
business contacts and the support of strategy development (see Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
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2003; Hillman and Daziel, 2003), which are emphasized in resource dependency theory but 
largely neglected by principal-agent theoretical approaches to corporate governance.  
While the fact that we did not find a clear relationship between firm performance and 
VC-entrepreneurial trust relationships might be related to our use of growth rather than profit 
performance data, and that our data are concurrent rather than lagged, it nevertheless raises 
questions about the complex relationship between trust and performance. While trust is 
expected to increase both parties’ willingness and ability to take potentially productive risks, 
trust might also allow entrepreneurs to engage in shirking. For future research this raises 
questions about whether the instruments used to measure trustworthiness and VC engagement 
need to be modified to be able to differentiate more clearly between different forms of trust 
(perceptions) and how they affect entrepreneurial behavior (e.g. via self-commitment, 
opportunistic behavior, etc.). Dirks and Ferrin (2001) argue for trust as a moderator of other 
independent variables’ impact on performance; this could be modeled in future studies. 
Our research investigates trust perceptions within existing VC-entrepreneur 
relationships. It would be interesting for future research to explore whether pre-existing trust 
between the VC and the entrepreneur affects the set-up and implementation of contractual 
relationships via longitudinal, qualitative and dyadic studies.  
 In conclusion, a workable degree of trust is essential for entrepreneurial ventures, and 
clearly a contract must be in place. However, this study raises concerns about VCs’ 
increasing preferences for neoclassical forms of contracting, as they can have unintended 
negative effects on the trust of the entrepreneur in the VC which, in turn, could impact on the 
venture’s performance as it might inhibit mutually beneficial cooperation between the 
entrepreneur and the VC (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). 
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Endnotes 
1 Lusch and Brown’s original items capturing “mutual understanding about legal remedies for 
failure to perform” and “mutual understanding about what happens in the case of events 
occurring that were not planned” did not load on the same factor as the other items associated 
with relational contracting. They each loaded high on a different, separate factor and were 
therefore removed from our scale. An explanation may be that, given the relatively short-term 
nature of the VC–entrepreneur relationship (usually 5-7 years), a number of firms in our 
sample may not have had the need or the chance to make adjustments to unexpected events, 
as major disagreements or a failure to perform may not have happened yet. Another 
explanation may lie in the disproportionate power in the relationship in favor of the VC: as 
we argued above, when unexpected events happen, VCs are likely to be better protected 
against downside risks than the entrepreneurial firm. 
2 Research by Welter et al. (2004) suggests that entrepreneurs in countries with weaker legal 
systems, where formal contracts are difficult to enforce, tend to rely on personal relationships 
and trust to acquire resources and exploit business opportunities. This suggests a substitutive 
relationship between trust and formal controls. However, their research further suggests that 
in countries with strong institutional structures, “personal trust mainly seems to play a 
complementary and second-best role” (Welter et al., 2004: 328). 
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Figure 2 Interaction between neoclassical contracting and ownership stake on 



































  30 
Table 1a: Factor analysis - trust scale 
 Trust 
Integrity  
Even when the VC gives us a rather unlikely explanation, we are confident that it is 
telling the truth  
0.47 
The VC usually keeps the promises that it makes to our firm 0.78 
Whenever the VC gives us advice on our business operations, we know that it is 
sharing its best judgment  
0.86 
Our organization can count on the VC to be sincere  0.84 
  
Benevolence  
Though circumstances change, we believe that the VC will be ready and willing to 
offer us assistance and support 
0.81 
When making important decisions, the VC is concerned about our welfare 0.80 
In the future, we can count on the VC to consider how its decisions and actions will 
affect us 
0.84 
When it comes to things that are important to us, we can depend on the VC’s support 0.78 
  
Percentage of variance explained (total: 60.87%)  
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Table 1b: Factor analysis - neoclassical contracting and relational contracting scales. 





…our contract precisely defines the roles of each party 0.85 0.09 
…our contract precisely defines the responsibilities of each party 0.82 0.14 




…our contract precisely states the legal remedies for failure to 
perform 0.89 -0.10 
…our contract precisely states what happens in the case of events 
occurring that were not planned 0.75 -0.20 
…we have a mutual understanding of the role of each party  -0.02 0.91 
…we have a mutual understanding of the responsibilities of each 
party 0.05 0.96 
…we have a mutual understanding of how each party is to 
perform 0.14 0.92 
    







Table 1c: Factor analysis - VC networking and VC monitoring scales. 





…helping to get additional finance partners 0.81 0.10 
…linking our company to potential strategic partners  0.83 0.13 
…increasing our company’s reputation 0.73 0.29 
…being the interface with the company’s investors 0.75 0.24 
…monitoring our company’s financial performance 0.08 0.89 
…monitoring our company’s operational performance 0.27 0.83 
…controlling our company’s costs 0.26 0.84 
   
Percentage of variance explained (total: 70.46%) 36.87% 33.59% 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, Pearson correlations and Cronbach alpha scores 
Variables Mean SD Pearson correlations and Cronbach alpha scores  
   1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.  
             
1. Relationship tenure 3.81 3.55 -          
2. ICT/life sciences firms n.a. n.a. -.25* -         
3. % Ownership entrepreneur 24.94 27.26 .01 -.22* -        
4. Firm size 156.63 293.44 .00 -.23* -.25* -       
5. Neoclassical contracting 4.70 1.52 -.11 -.07 .13 -.01 .88      
6. Relational contracting 5.11 1.18 -.04 .00 .07 .05 .37** .92     
7. VC added value in monitoring 3.73 1.47 -.21 .05 .00 -.05 .26* .45** .85    
8. VC added value in networking 3.84 1.48 -.07 .03 -.15 .08 .04 .25* .45** .81   
9. Entrepreneur’s trust in the VC 4.97 1.14 .12 -.29** .14 .02 .02 .56** .48** .35** .90  
             





Table 3: OLS-regression analysis of the relationship between contracting and the 
entrepreneur’s trust in the VC 
 Trust in the VC 
Model 1 β  
Intercept **  
Relationship tenure .11  
ICT/Life sciences firms -.31**  
LnFirm size 




Neoclassical contracting -.22*  
Relational contracting .46**  
VC added value in monitoring .27*  
VC added value in networking .17  
   
F statistic 11.72**  
Model R2 .60  
   
Note: Standardized beta coefficients are depicted. 
** p <.01, * p <.05. 
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Table 4: OLS moderated regression analysis of the relationship between contracting and the 
entrepreneur’s trust in the VC 
 Trust in the VC  
Model 2 β   
Intercept **   
Relationship tenure .10   
ICT/Life sciences firms -.33**   
LnFirm size  




Neoclassical contracting -.24**   
Relational contracting .53**   
VC added value in monitoring .26*   
VC added value in networking .15   
% Ownership entrepreneur x Neoclassical contracting -.18*  Δ F  4.40* 
  Δ R2 0.03 
F statistic 11.50**   
Model R2 .63   
    
Model 3    
Intercept **   
Relationship tenure .11   
ICT/Life sciences firms -.31**   
LnFirm size 




Neoclassical contracting -.19*   
Relational contracting .45**   
VC added value in monitoring .27*   
VC added value in networking .16   
Relational contracting x Neoclassical contracting .08 Δ F  .78 
  Δ R2 0.00 
F statistic 10.47**   
Model R2 .60   
Note: Standardized beta coefficients are depicted. 
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